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A CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF STATE
TAXATION OF EDGE ACT CORPORATE BRANCHES
INTRODUCTION
An Edge Act' corporation is a federally chartered entity engaging in
international banking and finance.2 Section 627 of the Edge Act 3
expressly empowers a state to tax the income of an Edge corporation if
its home office is located within the state. 4 Pursuant to a general
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id. § 611. Although theoretically Edge corporations can be organized by
individuals and non-banking institutions, Wiley, Edge Act Corporations-Catalysts
For International Trade and Investment, 16 Bus. Law. 1014, 1014-15 (1961), Edge
corporations in practice are owned by other banking institutions. Id. at 1015; S. Rep.
No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1421, 1425. Examples include Citibank, N.A., which owns Citibank International,
an Edge corporation with its home office in Florida and twelve domestic branches,
and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, which owns Manufacturers Hanover
International Banking Corp., an Edge corporation with its home office in Florida
and three domestic branches. See Board of Governors of the Federal System, Banking
Edge and Agreement Corporations Operating as of September 30, 1982, Computer
Printout [hereinafter cited as Banking Edge and Agreement Printout] and Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Edge and Agreement Corporations and
Branches, Computer Printout (Sept. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Branch Printout].
In order to arrive at the number of existing domestic Edge corporations and
branches, data from the Sept. 30, 1982 printout, which distinguished between Agree-
ment and Edge corporations, was compared with the data from the Sept. 10, 1982
printout, which collectively lists all existing Edge corporations and Agreement corpo-
rations and their branches. An Edge corporation is to be distinguished from an
Agreement corporation, which is a state-chartered entity engaged in activity similar
to that of an Edge corporation. Kelly, Edge Act Corporations After the International
Banking Act and New Regulation K: Implications for Foreign and Regional or
Smaller Banks, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 37, 38 n.10 (1979) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-
605 (1976)) (§ 605 repealed by Act of Aug. 23, 1935, ch. 614, § 329, 49 Stat. 717).
Agreement corporations are infrequently used, Kelly, supra, at 38 n.10, and there is
no express federal authority for a national bank to establish domestic branches of
such corporations. See 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1976) (only foreign branches are expressly
allowed). Only six Agreement corporations exist nationwide. See Banking Edge and
Agreement Printout and Branch Printout, supra.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). The provision states:
Any corporation organized under the provisions of this subchapter shall be
subject to tax by the State within which its home office is located in the
same manner and to the same extent as other corporations organized under
the laws of that State which are transacting a similar character of business.
The shares of stock in such corporation shall also be subject to tax as the
personal property of the owners or holders thereof in the same manner and
to the same extent as the shares of stock in similar State corporations.
Id.
4. Id.
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directive in section 3 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA),5
Federal Reserve Regulation K6 was amended in 1979 to permit Edge
corporations to establish domestic branches7 throughout the nation. s
Section 627 does not indicate, however, whether the income of such a
branch is subject to taxation 9 by the state in which it is located if the
home office of the Edge corporation is not located within that state.10
5. Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (currently codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 611a, 614, 615(a) & 618-619 (Supp. V 1981)).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1982) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1978)). The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System regulates the activities of an Edge corpora-
tion through this provision. See id. § 211.1-.7.
7. In general banking terms, a branch office is defined as an entity authorized
to perform general banking business, including accepting deposits and lending
money. Note, The International Banking Act of 1978, 19 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1011, 1012
n.9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as International Banking]; see 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976);
id. § 3101 (Supp. V 1981). By contrast, an agency is generally defined as a banking
office that is prohibited from accepting deposits. Id. § 3101; International Banking,
supra, at 1012 n.9. An agency, however, is authorized to maintain credit balances
and lend money. 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (Supp. V 1981). Prior to the amendment to
Regulation K, an Edge corporation was prohibited from establishing domestic
branches, but was allowed to establish domestic agencies with prior Federal Reserve
approval. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982). The
legislative history suggests that these agencies were not to have the same authority as
branches, see 58 Cong. Rec. 7857 (1919) (statements of Reps. Haugen & Platt), but
rather were allowed to represent the corporation. See id. Thus, the federal regula-
tions governing the establishment of Edge agencies stated that they could only be
established for "specific purposes," 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978), amended by 12
C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982), and could not generally perform the business of the Edge
corporation. Id. The location of the home office is contained in the articles of
association of the Edge corporation. 12 U.S.C. § 613 (1976).
There are two types of Edge corporations: those that are engaged in banking and
those that are engaged solely in investment. The distinctions between the two forms
of Edge corporations deal with deposits, lending and capital requirements. Roussa-
kis, Miami's Thrust in International Banking, 13 Law. of the Am. 468, 473 n.4
(1981). An Edge corporation "engaged in banking" accepts deposits in the United
States from "nonaffiliated" persons. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d) (1982). A credit ceiling of
10% of its capital and surplus limits the ability of the banking Edge corporation to
grant credit to any one individual. Id. § 211.6(b)(i). Capital requirements for the
corporation are set at 7% of risk assets. Roussakis, supra, at 473 n.4. An Edge
corporation engaged in investment does not accept deposits and has no capitalization
requirements. Id. (interpreting 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d), .6(b)(i) (1982)).
8. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978)).
9. This Note solely addresses the issue whether a state may impose a tax upon
the income of an Edge corporate branch. An income tax is distinguishable from a
bank shares tax, which is a tax upon the shareholders of a corporation. Society For
Say. v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1955). On a practical level, however, a shares
tax is paid by the corporation. Zamora, Regulating Foreign Bank Operations in
Texas, 19 Hous. L. Rev. 427, 463 (1982). The authority of a state to impose a
nondiscriminatory bank shares tax upon the shareholders of an Edge corporation is
expressly granted in § 627 without any limitation to the home state. 12 U.S.C. § 627
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Although one commentator has posited that the language in section
627 and the amendment to Regulation K have created a loophole
which permits branches located outside the home-office state to es-
cape taxation," the current policy of those states in which a substan-
tial number of Edge corporate branches are located is otherwise.
Florida, New York, Illinois and California deem Edge corporate
branches taxable under state corporate taxation statutes regardless of
the location of their home offices.' 2 Adding to the uncertainty, the
(1976). In the congressional debates leading to the passage of the Edge Act, the issue
arose whether the state in which the corporation is located or whether the state in
which the shareholder resides should have the authority to tax the shares. See 58
Cong. Rec. 8107-09 (1919) (general discussion). Two conflicting arguments were
presented. See id. at 8107-08 (statements of Reps. Connally & Wingo). One argu-
ment was that because a share of stock is personal property, the situs of such property
should follow the owner and be taxed in the state in which the owner resides. Id. at
8107 (statement of Rep. Connally). A second agrument was that the shares of stock
should be taxed in the same manner as the shares of a national bank were taxed. Id.
at 8108 (statement of Rep. Wingo). This would have limited the shares tax to the
state in which the corporation was located. See Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13
Stat. 99, 111-12, amended by Act of Feb. 4, 1868, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 34 (national bank
statute). This second argument was initially accepted in the House, 58 Cong. Rec.
8109 (1919), and express language was included in the provision to limit shares
taxation to the state in which the home office was located. Id. at 8107. The limita-
tion, however, was later expressly eliminated in conference with the Senate. H.R.
Rep. No. 473, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919). See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text.
10. See 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). Commentators have interpreted this absence of
statutory language addressing the taxation of these branches as prohibiting such
taxation. See O'Brien, State and Local Taxation of Branches of Edge Act Corpora-
tions- Opportunities and Limitations, 96 Banking L.J. 893, 894-95 (1979) (assuming
states cannot tax branches if home office not located in the state); Note, New Rules
For Edge Act Corporations Under the International Banking Act of 1978, 3 Fordham
Int'l L.F. 193, 219 (1980) (a "strict reading" suggests states cannot tax branches)
[hereinafter cited as New Rules].
11. O'Brien, supra note 10, at 895 ("The history of bank taxation in the United
States suggests that Congress intended this result."). In the sole judicial decision
addressing the state taxation of an Edge corporation, Commonwealth v. First Penn-
sylvania Overseas Fin. Corp., 425 Pa. 143, 229 A.2d 896 (1967), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in dictum, interpreted § 627 as prohibiting state taxation of an Edge
corporation if the home office of the corporation is located outside the state. Id. at
146, 229 A.2d at 898. The issue was whether a federally chartered Edge corporation
with its home office in Pennsylvania was subject to a state capital stock tax. Although
branching was not permitted at the time of the decision, the court's statement could
be relied upon subsequent to the amendment to Regulation K to preclude states'
taxation of branches that are not located in the home state.
12. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 23,151, 23,181 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982) (the
applicability of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified
in a letter, dated Feb. 11, 1983, from Mr. Benjamin F. Miller, Supervising Counsel,
Multistate Research and Regulations Section, California Franchise Tax Board (on file
with the Fordham Law Review)); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 220.62-.63, .69 (West Supp.
1983) (the applicability of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches
was verified in a phone inquiry, on Apr. 21, 1983, to Mr. Frank J. Siska, Technical
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American Bar Association Committee on Banking and Savings Institu-
tions (ABA Committee) has recommended repeal of section 62713 as
part of a broader plan to create a uniform system of state taxation of
federal depositories. 14
This Note contends that no constitutional basis exists for holding
Edge corporate branches immune from state taxation. Part I reviews
the historical development of the Edge corporation and describes the
legislative amendments that have led to the ambiguity concerning
branch taxation. Part II examines the congressional intent behind
section 627 and concludes that the legislative history does not support
an interpretation that would exclude an Edge corporate branch from
taxation by the state in which it is doing business. Part III examines
the criteria for state tax immunity of a federal instrumentality, and
determines that this immunity should not be available to Edge corpo-
rations. In addition, policy considerations support subjecting Edge
corporate branches to taxation by the states from which they obtain
significant benefits. This Note acknowledges that future congressional
action is appropriate. The absence of such action, however, should
not preclude the judicial determination that an Edge corporate
branch may be taxed by the state in which it has an office to do
business.
I. THE EDGE ACT CORPORATION
A. Historical Development
Congress authorized banks to create Edge corporations in 1919
under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act 15 in response to a need
to provide Europe with international credit and to secure the nation's
Assistant, Bureau of Technical Assistance, Florida State Department of Revenue); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 2-201, 3-304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (the applicability
of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified in a phone
inquiry, on Feb. 14, 1983, to Mr. Hal Crandell, Supervisor of Rules and Regulations,
Income Tax Legal Division, Illinois Department of Revenue); N.Y. Tax Law § 1451
(McKinney 1975) (the applicability of this tax provision to Edge corporations and
branches was verified in a letter, dated Feb. 25, 1983, from Mr. Andrew F. Mar-
chese, Chief of Tax Regulations, Technical Services Bureau, New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance (on file with the Fordham Law Review)). The
majority of Edge corporate branches and home offices are located in California,
Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas. See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout,
supra note 2, and Branch Printout, supra note 2, and Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Nonbanking Edge and Agreement Corporations Operating
as of year-end 1981, Computer Printout [hereinafter cited as Nonbanking Edge and
Agreement Printout].
13. Committee on Banking and Sav. Insts., Tax Section Recommendation No.
1981-3, 34 Tax Law. 861, 862 (1981).
14. See id.
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
[Vol. 51
1983] STATE TAXATION OF EDGE BRANCHES 995
foreign trade market after World War J.16 The Edge corporation
originally was empowered to provide general banking services for
international transactions,' 7 to establish overseas branches,' 8 to re-
ceive deposits in the United States relating to international business
transactions,' 9 and to invest in the stock of other corporations.2 0 Fed-
16. See Cong. Rec. 8082 (1919) (statement of Rep. Phelan); J. Baker & M.
Bradford, American Banks Abroad: Edge Act Companies and Multinational Banking
49 (1974); McGuire, The Edge Act: Its Place in the Evolution of International
Banking in the United States, 3 Law. of the Am. 427, 430-31 (1971). Prior to the
passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, national banks had no authority to
engage in international finance. McGuire, supra, at 429; Wiley, supra note 2, at
1016-19. The vast majority of American foreign trade was financed in sterling by
London banks. Tamagna & Willis, United States Banking Organization Abroad, 42
Fed. Res. Bull. 1284, 1286 (1956). In order to furnish American banks with the
power to finance the nation's growing foreign trade, Congress passed the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913. It provided that "any national banking association having a
capital and surplus of $1,000,000 or more might establish branches in foreign coun-
tries... with the approval of the Federal Reserve Board." H.R. Rep. No. 408, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1919); see Federal Reserve Act of 1913, § 25, 38 Stat. 251, 273
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)). Only a few large, well-established
American banks took advantage of this new authority. J. Baker & M. Bradford,
supra, at 25. Discrimination against the dollar and competition from European
banks limited bank expansion under the Act. McGuire, supra, at 429. To rectify the
situation, in 1916 Congress empowered a national bank with capital and surplus of
$1,000,000 or more to invest up to 10% of its capital and surplus in federal or state-
chartered financial institutions engaging in international banking. Act of Sept. 7,
1916, 39 Stat. 752, 755-56 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)). Because
no federal charter for an international banking institution existed in 1916, only a
state charter could be used. These entities are now known as "Agreement Corpora-
tions." McGuire, supra, at 430; Wiley, supra note 2, at 1016. See supra note 2. Only
eight American financial institutions took advantage of these statutory provisions.
H.R. Rep. No. 408, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1919). In order to enhance the prestige of
these banks in international markets, Congress established a federal charter for
international banking corporations. 12 U.S.C. §§ 612-614 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see
58 Cong. Rec. 8083 (1919) (statement of Rep. Phelan); J. Baker & M. Bradford,
supra, at 51. Congress believed that a federal charter would provide the corporation
with greater respect in international markets, and better establish a uniform system
of American involvement in international banking. 58 Cong. Rec. 8082 (1919) (state-
ment of Rep. Phelan); J. Baker & M. Bradford, supra, at 51.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(d)-(e), 92
Stat. 607, 609 (1978) (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (Supp. V
1981)).
18. Id. § 615(b).
19. Id. § 615(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(d)-(e), 92 Stat. 607, 609
(1978) (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
20. Id. § 615(c). The powers of an Edge corporation originally were limited in
four ways: 1) a minimum capital investment of $2,000,000 was required to obtain a
federal charter, id. § 618, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(d), 92 Stat. 607, 609
(1978) (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 618 (Supp. V 1981)); 2) United
States citizenship was a prerequisite for directorship, id. § 614; 3) the parent com-
pany could invest only 10 % of its capital and surplus in an Edge corporation, id. §
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eral Reserve Regulation K, issued in 1920,21 did not allow an Edge
corporation to establish any domestic branches. 22 In order for a bank
to establish Edge corporate offices in several states, each office was
required to be separately incorporated within the state in which the
bank wished to operate, with a minimum capital investment of two
million dollars.2 3 Because of this incorporation requirement and the
authorization of home state taxation in section 627, a state effectively
had the authority to tax an Edge corporation located and incorpo-
rated within its borders.
Section 3 of the IBA24 was the first major revision of the Edge Act.25
Prior to 1978, the "antiquated statutory and regulatory framework"2
under which an Edge corporation operated hampered its ability to
compete effectively with foreign-based institutions.2 7 Consequently,
Edge corporate development lagged prior to the passage of the IBA.28
618, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(d), 92 Stat. 607, 609 (1978) (currently
codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 618 (Supp. V 1981)); and 4) all transactions had
to be incidental to international business as determined by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 615(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(d)-
(e), 92 Stat. 607, 609 (1978) (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 615(a)
(Supp. V 1981)).
21. J. Baker & M. Bradford, supra note 16, at 33.
22. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982).
Regulation K did allow the Edge corporation to establish "agencies" in other states
with prior Board approval. Id. However, the "agency" was generally not allowed to
"carry on [the Edge Corporation's] business." Id. By contrast, a domestic branch of
an Edge corporation is now authorized to carry on banking business. See id. §
211.4(c) (1982) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978)). See supra note 7.
23. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The International Bank-
ing Act of 1978: A Report by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Sept. 17, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Reserve Report], reprinted in Foreign
Bank Operations and Acquisitions in the United States: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400, 1404
(1981); Cobb, A Shot in the Arm For Edge Act Corporations, 97 Banking L.J. 236,
237 (1980). An Edge corporation could, however, establish both domestic agencies
and overseas branches. 12 U.S.C. § 615(b) (1976) (overseas branches and agencies);
12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978) (domestic agencies), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c)
(1982).
24. Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 611(a),
614, 615(a) & 618-619 (Supp. V 1981)).
25. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 36,006 (1979). For a detailed analysis of the IBA and its
effect on the Edge corporation, see Cobb, supra note 23; Foorman, Revised Regula-
tion K: Selected Issues Affecting Banking Edge Corporations, 1980 U. Ill. L. F. 41;
Kelly, supra note 2; New Rules, supra note 10, at 193.
26. S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1421, 1424.
27. Id.
28. By 1929, 15 Edge corporations had been chartered. McGuire, supra note 16,
at 436. However, all 15 were liquidated or absorbed within the next decade. Id. Only
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The IBA relaxed certain restrictions and allowed Edge corporations
greater flexibility in expanding their operations.2 9 Pursuant to a gen-
eral directive of the IBA, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System amended Regulation K in 1979 to allow Edge corpora-
tions to establish interstate branches with prior approval of the Board
of Governors.3" The amendments appear to have been successful in
expanding Edge corporate development; today, seventy-one Edge cor-
porations with ninety domestic branches engaged in international
banking exist nationwide. 31
six Edge corporations were in existence as of 1956. Tamagna & Willis, supra note 16,
at 1292. After a surge of Edge corporate development in the late 1960's and early
1970's, see The edge is off the Edge Act banks, Bus. Wk., Apr. 7, 1975, at 42, col. 1,
only four new Edge corporations were established in 1977 and 1978. Federal Reserve
Report, supra note 23, at 1405.
29. Subsection 3(a) of the IBA stated that the objective of the Act was to modify
the provisions of the Edge Act that discriminated against foreign banking institutions
and hindered the competitiveness of the Edge corporation. The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System was directed to revise its regulations governing the
Edge corporation in light of this congressional objective. Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(a),
92 Stat. 607, 608 (1978). Subsection 3(b) established a policy statement for the Edge
Act. Id. § 3(b), 92 Stat. at 607, 608-09 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 611a (Supp. V 1981)).
Subsection 3(c) eliminated the United States citizenship requirement for ownership of
an Edge corporation. Id. § 3(c), 92 Stat. at 609 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 614 (Supp. V
1981)). Subsection 3(d) eliminated the restriction on outstanding liabilities. Id. §
3(d), 92 Stat. at 609 (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 615(a), 618 (Supp. V 1981)). Origi-
nally, the Edge corporation was prohibited from having outstanding liabilities at any
one time on its bonds, promissory notes, or debentures in excess of ten times its paid-
in capital and surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976). Subsection 3(e) eliminated the
mandatory ten percent reserve requirement on deposits and subjected the Edge
corporation to the same requirements as member banks of the Federal Reserve
System. Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(e), 92 Stat. 607, 609 (1978) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §
615(a) (Supp. V 1981)). Subsection 3(f) allowed foreign-owned banks to acquire a
majority interest in an Edge corporation if prior approval of the Board of Governors
was obtained. Id. § 3(f), 92 Stat. at 609-10 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 619 (Supp. V
1981)).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978)). The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System must approve the establishment of
a domestic branch and will consider the same factors as it does in reviewing a request
for an Edge corporate charter. Id. § 211.4(a). Those factors are: 1) "the financial
condition of the applicant"; 2) "the general character of its management"; 3) the
need for the services; and 4) the effects on competition. Id. Because the authority to
allow Edge corporations to establish domestic branches was not explicit in the IBA's
general directive, it has been suggested that revised Regulation K may be susceptible
to constitutional challenge. See Zamora, supra note 9, at 457 n.171. Another com-
mentator has suggested that the revision to Regulation K is consistent with the
congressional mandate. Kelly, supra note 2, at 45.
31. See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and Branch Print-
out, supra note 2. There are also fifty-one separate Edge corporations in existence
engaged in international investment. See Nonbanking Edge and Agreement Printout,
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B. State Taxation of Edge Corporate Branches
Despite this branching authorization, 3 section 627, empowering
states in which the home office is located to tax the Edge corporation,
was not amended to address the taxation of these branches.3 3 This
legislative inaction, in combination with the current taxation practice
of several states, has led to uncertainty in the taxation of Edge corpo-
rate branches.3 4 Nevertheless, most of those states in which the major-
ity of Edge branches are located generally have determined that the
Edge corporate branch should not escape taxation in the state in
which it is doing business.35 For example, Illinois has deemed an Edge
supra note 12. The IBA was immediately successful in escalating Edge corporate
development. In the first 15 months after the passage of the IBA, 39 new Edge
corporate offices were approved. Of these 39, 27 were branches of previously existing
Edge corporations. Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23, at 1405.
The authority to branch across state lines allows the Edge corporation to expand
more efficiently and at lower cost because the minimum capital requirement, 12
U.S.C. § 618 (1976), does not apply to branch expansion. Thus, it is probable that
Edge corporate expansion will usually occur through the establishment of branches,
rather than through the chartering of new corporations. Roussakis, supra note 7, at
474-80. This trend is made apparent by the frequency of banks consolidating their
Edge corporations and establishing a home office with several branches. Id. at 476-
78.
32. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978)).
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). Congress and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System did not discuss the statutory provision when deciding on the
appropriate amendments and revisions. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 36,006 (1979); S.
Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1421, 1422.
34. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
35. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 23,151, 23,181 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982) (the
applicability of these provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified in a
letter, dated Feb. 11, 1983, from Mr. Benjamin F. Miller, Supervising Counsel,
Multistate Research and Regulations Section, California Franchise Tax Board (on file
with the Fordham Law Review)); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 220.62-.63, .69 (West Supp.
1983) (the applicability of these provisions to Edge corporations and branches was
verified in a phone inquiry, on Apr. 21, 1983, to Mr. Frank J. Siska, Technical
Assistant, Bureau of Technical Assistance, Florida State Department of Revenue); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 2-201, 3-304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (the applicability
of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified in a phone
inquiry, on Feb. 14, 1983, to Mr. Hal Crandell, Supervisor of Rules and Regulations,
Income Tax Legal Division, Illinois Department of Revenue); N.Y. Tax Law § 1451
(McKinney 1975) (the applicability of this tax provision to Edge corporations and
branches was verified in a letter, dated Feb. 25, 1983, from Mr. Andrew F. Mar-
chese, Chief of Tax Regulations, Technical Services Bureau, New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance (on file with the Fordham Law Review)). There is a
trend among the states, however, to exempt international banking facilities from
taxation in order to attract and maintain international banking business. Roussakis,
supra note 7, at 482; see, e.g., 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 825 (West); 1978 N.Y. Laws
288. An international banking facility is defined as "a set of asset and liability
[Vol. 51998
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branch taxable under its corporate tax statutes regardless of the loca-
tion of its home office. 36 Similarly, the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance has determined that Edge corporate branches
located in New York with home offices outside the state are taxable
because section 627 does not address, and accordingly does not pro-
hibit, the state from taxing Edge corporate branches. 37 In Florida, the
income of a branch is taxable provided that it is not attributed to the
activity of the home office. 38 This practice would seem to protect the
corporation from double taxation. 39 Edge corporate branches in Cali-
accounts segregated on the books and records of a depository institution, United
States branch or agency of a foreign bank, or an Edge or Agreement Corporation that
includes only international banking facility time deposits and international banking
facility extensions of credit." 12 C.F.R. § 204.8(a)(1) (1982).
36. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 2-201, 3-304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) (the
applicability of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified
in a phone inquiry, on Feb. 14, 1983, to Mr. Hal Crandell, Supervisor of Rules and
Regulations, Income Tax Legal Division, Illinois Department of Revenue). Approxi-
mately ten Edge corporate branches are located in Illinois. See Banking Edge and
Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and Branch Printout, supra note 2. Approximately
seven home offices are located in Illinois. See Banking Edge and Agreement Edge
Printout, supra note 2, and Nonbanking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note
12.
37. N.Y. Tax Law § 1451 (McKinney 1975) (the applicability of this tax provison
to Edge corporations and branches was verified in a letter, dated Feb. 25, 1983, from
Mr. Andrew F. Marchese, Chief of Tax Regulations, Technical Services Bureau, New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance (on file with the Fordham Law
Review)). Approximately 12 Edge corporate branches are located in New York. See
Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and Branch Printout, supra
note 2. Approximately 31 Edge corporations have their home offices in New York.
See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2; NonBanking Edge and
Agreement Printout, supra note 12.
38. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 220.62-.63, .69 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (the applicability
of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified in a phone
inquiry, on Apr. 21, 1983, to Mr. Frank J. Siska, Technical Assistant, Bureau of
Technical Assistance, Florida State Department of Revenue). Approximately 8 Edge
corporate branches are located in Florida. See Banking Edge and Agreement Print-
out, supra note 2, and Branch Printout, supra note 2. Approximately 28 home offices
are located in Florida. See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and
Nonbanking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 12. Because of recent amend-
ments to the Florida Tax Code, Edge corporations, as well as all other banks engaged
in international transactions, are subject only to a franchise tax in Florida. Roussakis,
The Edges Come to Miami, The Bankers Mag. May/June 1981, at 85-86 (interpreting
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 220.63 (West Supp. 1983)). This improvement in the Florida tax
environment is expected to attract more international banking business to the state.
Roussakis, supra, at 86.
39. Generally, a state may not tax income earned outside its borders. Asarco Inc.
v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 3109 (1982). If the income of a branch
was attributable to both the home office state and the branch state, both states would
be taxing the corporation on the same income. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. District
of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 556-57, 560-61 (1965) (apportionment formulas should
not cause multistate taxation of net income).
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fornia are taxable under a unitary apportionment method. 40 The
legislative history of section 627 does not appear to preclude these
policies.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 627
Section 627, by its terms, authorizes taxation of Edge corporate
income only by the state in which the home office is located. Under
the plain meaning rule, 4' therefore, a state would be prohibited from
taxing an Edge corporate branch if the home office was not located
within the state. 42 Assuming this result, a conflicting state taxation
statute that imposes a tax upon a branch when its home office is not
located within the state would be considered unconstitutional as a
violation of the supremacy clause. 43 The failure of Congress to revise
section 627 in light of the amendment to Regulation K, however, has
rendered section 627 ambiguous. 44 Accordingly, an examination of the
legislative history and purpose of section 627 is necessary to determine
40. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 23,151, 23,181 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982) (the
applicability of these tax provisions to Edge corporations and branches was verified
in a letter, dated Feb. 11, 1983, from Mr. Benjamin F. Miller, Supervising Counsel,
Multistate Research and Regulations Section, California Franchise Board (on file
with the Fordham Law Review)). A unitary method of apportioning income includes
the income of the corporation within the state in addition to the income of related
corporations if the activities of the related corporation outside the state are depen-
dent upon, or contribute to, the corporation's business within the state. State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 689 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Income
Hearings]. Approximately 17 Edge corporate branches and 13 home offices are
located in California. See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and
Branch Printout, supra note 2, and Nonbanking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra
note 12.
A substantial number of Edge corporate branches exist in Texas as well. See
Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and Branch Printout, supra
note 2. Because Texas specifically exempts all banks from the state franchise tax,
Texas Tax Code Ann. § 171.078 (Vernon 1981); Zamora, supra note 9, at 462-63, one
commentator has suggested that Edge corporations, like other banks, would there-
fore only be subject to the bank shares tax and real property tax. Id. at 463 (interpret-
ing Texas Tax Code Ann. § 171.078 (Vernon 1982)).
41. If the statutory language is clear, there is no need to examine legislative
history to determine congressional purpose. United States v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of
Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Federal Land Bank v. Priddy,
295 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1935).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
43. Cf. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971) (state statute in conflict
with Federal Bankruptcy Act violates the supremacy clause); Franklin Nat'l Bank v.
New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1954) (state statute in conflict with the Federal
Reserve Act violates the supremacy clause).
44. See 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
STATE TAXATION OF EDGE BRANCHES
whether states impliedly are forbidden from imposing a tax on Edge
branches if the home office is not located in the state. 45 The legislative
history, however, is not entirely clear. It can be interpreted either to
support or prohibit this taxation.
Upon introduction in the Senate, 46 the taxation provision of the
Edge Act provided that an Edge corporation would pay taxes "in like
manner as is paid by other banking corporations transacting business
in the United States."' 47 The debates preceding Senate approval of this
language give some indication that Edge corporations would not be
exempt from state taxation. 48 Senator Edge, the sponsor of the legisla-
tion, stated: "[A] corporation organized under [the Edge Act] would
be taxed in every way that any other similar corporation is taxed if
there is nothing said to the contrary. In other words, we define it
when we exempt, and when we do not define it they are not ex-
empted. '49 Senator Norris also stated that Edge corporations should
be taxed by any state in which they were located and doing business in
the same manner as other similar financial corporations:
[There] is no reason why [an Edge corporation] should be relieved
from taxes that other corporations doing business in those cities
have to pay to the States. They ought to be taxed like any other
banks. There ought to be no exemption about it. If they are located
in New York they get the protection of the laws of New York, and
45. If the language of a statute is ambiguous, the legislative history of the statute
should be examined to determine congressional intent. United States v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Aviation Consumer Action Project v. Washburn,
535 F.2d 101, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1976); District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of
Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Maryland Nat'l Bank, 44 Md. App. 366, 373, 408 A.2d 753, 757 (1979); see United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (should examine the
underlying legislative purpose); Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231-32
(1935) (same); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932) (same).
46. 58 Cong. Reec. 2579 (1919) (S. 2472). The bill was initially referred to the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. Id.
47. Id. at 4969.
48. See id. at 4968-69 (general discussion). As was the case with national banks,
the underlying intent of Congress was to guarantee that a state would not discrimina-
torily tax a federally chartered corporation in order to favor state-chartered organi-
zations. Id. at 8083 (statement of Rep. Phelan); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tax
Comm'n, 437 U.S. 255, 258 & n.2 (1978). One Senator, however, contended that
Edge corporations should not be subject to any state or local taxation because the
corporation would only be conducting international business. 58 Cong. Rec. 4969
(1919) (statement of Sen. Owen).
49. 58 Cong. Reec. 4969 (1919) (statement of Sen. Edge). The Senator further
stated that "we want to make it doubly sure, and inasmuch as no one wants [Edge
corporations] to escape any taxation, State or Federal, I am entirely satisfied to have
language inserted to make it clear." Id.
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they ought to be required to pay a tax to the State of New York the
same as any other corporation doing business in that State.50
Senate and House analogies to national banks, however, support a
more restrictive interpretation. Senator Norris endorsed a proposal
that would have taxed Edge corporations in the same manner "as
member banks of the Federal Reserve System."' Because member
banks include national banks, this phrase could be interpreted to
restrict state taxation of Edge corporations to the limited taxes im-
posed on national banks. 52 Although the Senate ultimately passed over
the "member banks" language, 53 Senator Norris and members of the
House drew more specific analogies to national bank taxation. Senator
Norris stated that it would be "satisfactory" if Edge corporations were
taxed like national banks. 54 Representative Wingo further stated that
the House version of the tax provision was to be interpreted as requir-
ing Edge corporations and their shares to be taxed in the same manner
as national banks and their shares.55 At that time, a state could not tax
the income of national banks, but rather was limited to real property
taxation and shares taxation by the state in which the bank was
"located." 56
These analogies drawn to national bank taxation, however, are
somewhat ambiguous. The statements of Senator Norris and Repre-
50. Id. (statement of Sen. Norris).
51. Id.
52. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve
System 64 (1961).
53. 58 Cong. Rec. 4969 (1919) (statement of the Presiding Officer).
54. Id. (statement of Sen. Norris).
55. Id. at 8108 (statement of Rep. Wingo). Representative Dunbar also made a
comparison to national banks. Id. at 8083 (statement of Rep. Dunbar). Representa-
tive Dunbar's statement, unlike Representative Wingo's, was made solely in the
context of shares taxation. Id.
56. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 99, 111-12, amended by Act of
Feb. 10, 1868, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 34, 34 (currently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976));
see Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899). In 1926, Con-
gress amended R.S. 5219 to allow states to tax the net income of national banks. Act
of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. 223 (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
548 (1976)). Until 1969, a state could only subject a national bank to taxation in the
four ways that Congress had expressly authorized in the statute. Id. (state could tax
the shares of a national bank, include dividends in the taxable income of a share-
holder, tax the national bank on its net income, or measure such tax by net income).
One commentator has suggested that a comparison of Edge corporate taxation to
national bank taxation indicates a congressional intent to limit state taxation to the
home state. O'Brien, supra note 10, at 894-95. Because Congress only specified state
taxation authority over Edge corporations by the state in which the home office is
located, 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976), Congress may have intended that the manner of
state taxation of Edge corporations be limited to the express provision. O'Brien, supra
note 10, at 895 ("Unless Congress assumed that the same principle would apply to
Edge Act corporations, the enactment of this [home state] provision is enigmatic.").
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sentative Wingo indicate that they were not entirely familiar with the
nature of the restrictions on national bank taxation at the time. Sena-
tor Norris believed that national banks were taxed by any state in
which they were doing business.5 7 Representative Wingo suggested
that Edge corporate taxation would not only be similar to national
bank taxation, but would also be similar to the taxation of other
corporations, such as state banks and oil corporations.58 Furthermore,
the analogies made in the House should not be deemed adequate to
restrict state income taxation to the home office state because they
were made principally in the context of the House discussion of shares
taxation. 59
A second argument against branch taxation can be premised on
these analogies to national banks. Because the national bank statute
restricted the taxation of national bank shares to the state in which the
bank was located,60 Congress may have intended to restrict Edge
corporate taxation to the state in which the home office was located.
This language, however, should not be interpreted to prohibit state
taxation of a branch merely because the home office is not located in
that state. At the time of the Edge Act's enactment, "located" was
necessarily restricted to the state of incorporation.6' Today, however,
an Edge branch may be located and doing business in states other than
the state in which the home office is located.62 In 1919, Congress did
not envision that an Edge corporation would be able to establish
domestic branches.6 3 This may have reflected the concern that branch
banking would lead to a dangerous concentration of power in the
banking field.6 4 Accordingly, one year after the Edge Act was passed
in 1919, the Federal Reserve enacted Regulation K65 which prohibited
57. 58 Cong. Rec. 4969 (1919) (statement of Sen. Norris).
58. Id. at 8108 (statement of Rep. Wingo).
59. Id. at 8107-09 (general discussion). There were only a few inconclusive
references to the taxation of corporate assets. See id. at 8109 (statement of Rep.
Black); id. at 8108 (statement of Rep. Wingo).
60. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61. This was a result of the restriction on domestic branching, see 12 C.F.R. §
211.6(a) (1978), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982), and the need to incorpo-
rate separately each corporate office, Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23, at 1404;
see 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-614, 618 (1976), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 618 (Supp. V 1981).
62. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982).
63. 58 Cong. Rec. 8100-01 (1919) (statements of Reps. Platt, Young, Cannon &
McFadden); see Tamagna & Willis, supra note 16, at 1288.
64. Tamagna & Willis, supra note 16, at 1288; see 58 Cong. Rec. 8100 (1919)
(statement of Rep. Cannon). This sentiment is consistent with the prevailing view
that a few large financial institutions may monopolize the banking industry if branch
banking is permitted. See Note, Interstate Branch Banking: That Someday is Today,
21 Washburn L.J. 266, 278 (1982).
65. Tamagna & Willis, supra note 16, at 1288.
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the Edge corporation from establishing domestic branches.66 There-
fore, dictum in Commonwealth v. First Pennsylvania Overseas Fi-
nance Corp.,67 which suggests that a state may not tax an Edge
corporation when its home office is not within state boundaries, 68 can
best be understood in light of this prohibition against Edge corporate
branching. Because the taxation statute exhibited no apparent ambi-
guity, this strict reading was appropriate.
A third argument against the taxation of branches could be based
on language deleted from the final version of section 627. The House
version of the tax provision 69 originally stated that shares of the corpo-
ration "owned by nonresidents of any State shall be taxed only in the
city or town in which the corporation's home office is located, and not
elsewhere."'7 0 In response to the argument that the state in which a
stockholder resides should be allowed to tax the shares, 7' this location
66. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a) (1978), amended by 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(c) (1982).
Today, restrictions on the ability of national banks to establish domestic branches
still exist. The McFadden Act allows a national bank to establish intrastate branches
only if the state in which it is located permits such branching. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1976). The statute does not authorize interstate branching. See id. The Douglas
Amendment to the Bank Holding Act prohibits a bank holding company from
crossing state lines unless the state in which the company wishes to locate has express
legislation allowing for such activity. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (Supp. V 1981). These
branching restrictions do not apply to Edge corporations. See id. § 36(c) (1976)
(McFadden Act expressly applies only to national banks); id. § 1841(c) (Bank Holding
Act expressly exempts all banks organized under § 25 and § 25(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act, which include Edge corporations). Congress excluded § 25(a) financial
institutions from the provisions of the Bank Holding Act because it believed that it
was unnecessary to restrict the expansion of organizations doing little domestic
business in order to prevent the domestic monopolization of the banking industry. S.
Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2482, 2488-89. National banks have taken advantage of these exemptions to
form Edge corporations as a means of expanding interstate. Branching Brouhaha,
Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1981, at 32, col. 1. While an Edge corporation cannot perform
domestic banking business that is not related to international transactions, 12 U.S.C.
§ 615(a) (Supp. V 1981), it does provide a convenient forum for a national bank to
establish a presence in a number of states. See Branching Brouhaha, supra, at 32, col.
1.
67. 425 Pa. 143, 229 A.2d 896 (1967).
68. Id. at 146, 229 A.2d at 898. There is only one Edge corporate branch in
Pennsylvania. See Banking Edge and Agreement Printout, supra note 2, and Branch
Printout, supra note 2. The author was unable to obtain a response whether the state
department of revenue exempts branches from taxation.
69. 58 Cong. Rec. 8107 (1919). The only difference between the House version
and the final version of § 627 is that the shares restriction was deleted in the final
provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 473, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919) (Conference
Report).
70. 58 Cong. Rec. 8107 (1919).
71. See, e.g., id. at 8107-09 (statements of Reps. Connally & Wingo). See supra
note 9.
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restriction on the taxation of shares was later deleted in conference.72
Because Congress expressly deleted the language in the Edge Act
restricting shares taxation to the state in which the home office was
located "and not elsewhere, '7 3 but did not delete the language re-
stricting corporate income taxation to the home office state, it may be
argued that an intent to restrict corporate taxation to the home office
state should be inferred.7 4 However, the wording of the deleted shares
taxation language was more restrictive than the language that now
appears in the income taxation provision. 75 The terms "only in the city
or town in which" and "not elsewhere" in the deleted shares provision
of the House version suggested an absolute ban on state shares taxation
if the home office was not located within the state. No equivalent
language was in the corporate income tax provision of the House
version. 76 Thus, it may be argued that Congress did not change the
language of the corporate income tax provision because it did not view
the language as an absolute ban. In addition, reliance upon a compar-
ison of the home state specification in the corporate income tax provi-
sion with the deleted bank shares tax restriction should not be disposi-
tive because the taxes are conceptually different. 77
A fourth argument against Edge branch taxation can be based on
the recent amendments to the national bank statutes. Because Con-
gress repealed the ban of multi-state taxation of national banks in the
1969 amendments to the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA)7s and did
72. H.R. Rep. No. 473, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919) (Conference Report).
73. See id.
74. This is an application of the maxim of statutory construction known as
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory
Construction §§ 47.23-.25 (4th ed. 1973). The maxim means the expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of another. See id. § 47.23, at 123. The maxim should not,
however, be applied when an expansive interpretation would be consistent with
public policy. 2A C. Sands, supra, § 47.25.
75. Compare 58 Cong. Rec. 8107 (1919) (House version of § 627) with 12 U.S.C.
§ 627 (1976) (final version of § 627).
76. See 58 Cong. Rec. 8107 (1919).
77. The corporate tax issue does not involve the question of where the situs of
personal property should be. For the general distinctions between these taxes, see
supra note 9.
78. Compare Pub. L. No. 91-156, §§ 1(a), 2(a), 83 Stat. 434 (1969) (authorizing
interstate taxation of national banks) (currently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976))
with Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. (pt. II) 223 (limiting state taxation of
national banks to the state in which the bank is located and to four methods of
taxation) (currently codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)). In the debates
leading to the passage of the 1969 amendments, concern was voiced over the advisa-
bility of granting tax authority to state governments other than the home state. S.
Rep. No. 530, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1594, 1596-97. A Treasury Department representative stated "that the question of
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not authorize state taxation of Edge corporate branches in the IBA,
the congressional silence in section 627 could be interpreted as a
deliberate omission.7 9 The date of, and authorization for, Regulation
K, however, clearly indicates that the omission was not intentional.
Although section 3 of the IBA directed the Federal Reserve to amend
its regulations so as to provide Edge corporations greater flexibility, it
did not specifically direct the Federal Reserve to authorize domestic
branching.s0 The Board, however, relied on the general directive to
provide for this branching authorization. 8 The drafters of the IBA
therefore had no reason to address the taxation of branches because
the issue did not arise until after the amendment to Regulation K.
Finally, despite the possible arguments in favor of a restrictive
reading of section 627, it is phrased as an affirmative grant of state
taxation authority. 2 The ambiguity in both the final version of section
627 and its legislative history therefore should not be interpreted to
reflect congressional intent to preclude state taxation of an Edge
corporation in states in which the home office is not located. Accord-
taxation of national banks by States other than the home State, [should] be consid-
ered and treated separately." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 1596. Because of this stated concern, Congress separately dealt with inter-
state taxation in the amendments. Pub. L. No. 91-156, §§ 1-2, 83 Stat. 434 (1969). A
temporary amendment was passed restricting the taxing authority of states in which
the home office was not located. Id. § 1, 83 Stat. at 434. A permanent amendment
was to be implemented in 1972 providing for nondiscriminatory taxation by all
states. Id. § 2, 83 Stat. at 434. However, the implementation was postponed on three
occasions. Pub. L. No. 92-213, § 4(a), 85 Stat. 775, 775 (1971); Pub. L. No. 93-100, §
7(c), 87 Stat. 342, 347 (1973); Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 1, 90 Stat. 197, 197 (1976). The
moratorium expired on Septemb6r 12, 1976, Levinson, Interstate Taxation and
Apportionment of Bank Income, 34 Nat'l Tax J. 447, 449 (1981); O'Brien, supra note
10, at 893 n.4, and today there is no restriction upon state taxation of national banks.
12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976). See generally Levinson, supra, at 447-49 (discussing the
amendments to the NBA). While federal and state law restrict the ability of national
banks to branch across state lines, see supra note 66, national banks do maintain
"loan and deposit generating offices and representatives in other states. . . regularly
contact out-of-state customers to maintain and expand business." Levinson, supra, at
449.
79. This is an application of the maxim of statutory construction known as
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See supra note 74.
80. See Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 607, 608 (1978). See supra notes 29-
30 and accompanying text.
81. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 36,005-06 (1979).
82. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976) (Edge corporation) ("Any corporation
organized under. . . this subchapter shall be subject to tax by the State within which
its home office is located in the same manner and to the same extent as other
corporations. ... ) with Act of Mar. 25, 1926, ch. 88, 44 Stat. (pt II) 223 (national
bank) ("The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the
provisions of this section, the manner and place of taxing ....") and 12 U.S.C. §
2055 (1976) (Federal Land Bank) ("Every Federal land bank ...shall be exempt
from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation.").
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ingly, states should have the power to tax Edge corporate branches
unless the Constitution, under the federal instrumentality doctrine,
mandates otherwise.
III. EDGE CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITY ANALYSIS
A. Federal Instrumentality Defined
A federal instrumentality is an entity so closely connected to the
federal government that it becomes "one of its constituent parts. '8 3 As
such, it is not subject to the plenary taxation powers of the states.8 4 A
state therefore may not, without the express consent of Congress, levy
a tax upon it.8 5 Thus, if the Edge corporation is considered to be a
federal instrumentality, a state may tax it only as Congress expressly
authorizes. Section 627 expressly provides for taxation only by the
state in which the home office is located.86 Therefore, assuming that
the Edge corporation is a federal instrumentality, the absence of
statutory language authorizing state taxation of branch offices pro-
hibits a state from imposing a tax on an Edge corporate branch if the
home office is not located within that state.87
83. United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); see United
States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982) (a federal instrumentality is an entity
"so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed
as separate entities"); Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355,
359-60 (1966) (a federal instrumentality is "virtually . . . an arm of the Govern-
ment"); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485 (1942) (a federal instrumen-
tality is an "[arm] of the Government deemed by it essential for the performance of
governmental functions").
84. Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146, 149 (1961);
see, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 733 (1982); First Agricultural
Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 350 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 43-44 (1964); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
159, 213, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819); United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 639
F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981); B. Schwartz,
Constitutional Law § 2.6, at 56 (1979); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-
29, at 395 (1978). If an organization is deemed a federal instrumentality and is
therefore not subject to the plenary powers of the state to tax, the organization may
still be subject to other forms of state regulation. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross
v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 363 Mass. 525, 529-30, 296 N.E. 2d 214, 217-18 (1973)
(even though the Red Cross is a federal instrumentality, it is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state labor relations commission).
85. See, e.g., First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339,
340 (1968); Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146, 149
(1961); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958); Kern-Limerick,
Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 446
(1943); First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347 (1926); United States v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 639 F.2d 458, 459 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028
(1981); L. Tribe, supra note 84, § 6-28, at 391-92; id. § 6-29, at 394-95.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
87. See First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347 (1926); Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. 326, 381, 9 Wheat. 738, 865-66 (1824); L. Tribe, supra
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The basis for this exemption from state taxation is found in the
supremacy clause of the Constitution,"8 as initially interpreted in
McCulloch v. Maryland.8 9 Since then, the distinction between a tax-
able entity and an immune instrumentality "has been drawn by an
unsteady hand"9' 0 in a field of law that has been "much litigated and
often confused." 91 Today, no simple test is available for determining
the existence of a federal instrumentality. 2 Courts generally have
looked to organizational and operational characteristics that suggest
that the entity is virtually "an arm of the Government."'9 3 This analy-
note 84, § 6-28, at 391-92. By contrast, some courts have suggested that when
statutory language providing for state taxation exists, but is at variance with the
intent of the legislature, a court should go beyond the plain words of the statute and
look to the underlying legislative intent as revealed by the statute's legislative history.
See, e.g., First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 343
(1968) (legislative history examined in determining whether the federal national
bank taxation statute prescribed the only method of state taxation of a national
bank); District of Columbia Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (legislative history examined in determining that a national bank
was subject to a District of Columbia gross earnings tax even though the federal
taxation statutes did not expressly provide for gross earnings taxation); Comptroller
of the Treasury v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 44 Md. App. 366, 373-74, 408 A.2d 753, 757
(1979) (legislative history examined in determining whether a national bank is ex-
empt from a local retail sales tax). For a discussion of the legislative history of the
Edge Act, see supra pt. II.
88. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720,
733 (1982); B. Schwartz, supra note 84, § 2.6, at 55-56; L. Tribe, supra note 84, § 6-
29, at 395. In addition, at least one court has held that federal restrictions on
interstate taxation of banks can be upheld under Congress' power under the com-
merce clause. See Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Department of Revenue,
645 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Or.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 216 (1982) (upholding the 1973
moratorium on interstate taxation of federal depositories on the basis of Congress'
commerce clause power).
89. 17 U.S. 59, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). Stating that the "power to tax involves the
power to destroy," id. at 210, 4 Wheat. at 431, Chief Justice Marshall struck down a
Maryland stamp tax on bank notes issued by the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the
United States and held the bank to be a tax-immune federal instrumentality. Id. at
213, 4 Wheat. at 436. He reasoned that a state infringes upon the supremacy clause
of the Constitution when it attempts to tax the operations of organizations with
federal charters and supervision. Id. at 212-13, 4 Wheat. at 435-36.
90. United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944).
91. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958).
92. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1966);
United States v. District of Columbia, No. 82-0923, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Sept. 3,
1982). The analysis requires "more than the invocation of traditional agency no-
tions." United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 736 (1982).
93. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1966);
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485 (1942); see, e.g., Federal Reserve
Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist. #1, 657 F.2d 183, 185-86 (8th Cir. 1981),
aff'd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982); United States v. City of Adair, 539 F.2d 1185, 1191 (8th
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sis focuses on whether the imposition of the tax would significantly
interfere with the exercise of a federal function. 4 The key factors
weighing in favor of tax immunity can be summarized as follows: 1)
whether the chartering body of the entity is federal;95 2) whether the
federal government exerts substantial supervision and financial in-
volvement;96 and 3) whether the entity performs an essential govern-
mental function.9 7 In addition, whether the entity is operated for
profit has been deemed important in certain circumstances. 9 Never-
theless, many financial institutions that operate for private profit have
been deemed federal instrumentalities because they significantly af-
fect the national economy and therefore perform an important gov-
ernmental function. 99
B. Application of Federal Instrumentality Analysis to
Edge Act Corporations
Various organizational aspects of an Edge corporation may be char-
acterized as federal. The chartering body of the Edge corporation is
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200
F.2d 420, 466 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953); United States v.
District of Columbia, No. 82-0923, slip op. at 7-8 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1982); Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gibson
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
94. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 & n.11 (1982); Metcalf
& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 52.3-25 (1926).
95. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-59
(1966); Federal Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist. #1, 657 F.2d 183,
186 (8th Cir. 1981), affd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982); United States v. District of Columbia,
No. 82-0923, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1982).
96. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-60
(1966); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483-85 (1942); United States v.
District of Columbia, No. 82-0923, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1982); Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364, 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Direct
federal supervision of the daily operations of an entity is not required to meet the
criteria for tax immunity under the federal instrumentality doctrine. See Department
of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1966).
97. See Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60
(1966); Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982); Rust v. Johnson,
597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); Fahey v. O'Melveny
& Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 952 (1953);
United States v. District of Columbia, No. 82-0923, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Sept. 3,
1982); United States v. Maine, 524 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (D. Me. 1981).
98. United States v. District of Columbia, No. 82-0923, slip op. at 9-10 (D.D.C.
Sept. 3, 1982); see Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484-85 (1942); United
States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 18, 23 (E.D.S.C. 1959), affd per curiam, 364
U.S. 281 (1960).
99. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1982)
(dictum) (federal reserve bank); Federal Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement
Dist. #1, 657 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1981) (same), afJ'd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982); Rust v.
Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir. 1979) (Federal National Mortgage Association).
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the federal government. 100 Among the numerous federal statutory
provisions and regulations governing the activities of the Edge corpo-
ration, 10 the Edge Act prescribes capital requirements. 0 2 In addition,
approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is
required for both the initial incorporation and any branch expansion
of an Edge corporation. 0 3 Like Federal Reserve Banks that have been
determined to further national monetary policy, 0 4 Edge corporations
may be considered to further the nation's foreign trade policy. ' s
Congress created the Edge corporation to provide credit to organiza-
tions in foreign countries in order to secure an effective international
market for American products. 06 The legislative history of the Edge
Act also reveals that the House wanted to require the use of the word
"Federal" in the name of each Edge corporation and prevent state
corporations not associated with the federal government from using
this term. 10 7
Nevertheless, these federal characteristics should not be sufficient to
grant tax immunity to the Edge corporation under the federal instru-
mentality doctrine. 08 The Supreme Court has held that only those
100. 12 U.S.C. § 614 (Supp. V 1981); 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(a) (1982).
101. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.4-.7
(1982). The deposits of an Edge corporation are subject to federally prescribed
reserve requirements. Id. § 211.4(d). The domestic activity of the Edge corporation
must be incidental to international business transactions. Id. § 211.4(e). The corpora-
tion is required to keep records concerning financial performance and management
decisions. Id. § 211.7(a). Examiners appointed by the Board of Governors must
review the corporation's records annually. Id. § 211.7(b). The corporation must file
two reports annually with the Board dealing with the condition of the corporation.
Id. § 211.7(c).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (Supp. V 1981). Strict lending limits also have been pre-
scribed. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6 (1982).
103. 12 U.S.C. § 614 (Supp. V 1981) (approval for initial incorporation); 12
C.F.R. § 211.4(a), .4(c) (1982) (approval for branch expansion).
104. Although the following courts refer to the furtherance of fiscal policy, it is
clear from the context that they were actually referring to the furtherance of mone-
tary policy. Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982); Federal
Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist. #1, 657 F.2d 183, 185-86 (8th Cir.
1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982).
105. See S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1421, 1422-26; 58 Cong. Rec. 8082 (1919) (statement of Rep.
Phelan); Wiley, supra note 2, at 1014.
106. 58 Cong. Rec. 8082 (1919) (statement of Rep. Phelan); J. Baker & M.
Bradford, supra note 16, at 49; McGuire, supra note 16, at 430-31; Wiley, supra note
2, at 1017-18. The Edge corporation also was intended to compete effectively with
similar foreign institutions and strengthen the nation's control of international bank-
ing. S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1421, 1424; J. Baker & M Bradford, supra note 16, at 51.
107. H.R. Rep. No. 408, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919).
108. A federal charter alone is not adequate to hold an organization immune from
state taxation. Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178, 181 (1933); Western
1010 [Vol. 51
1983] STATE TAXATION OF EDGE BRANCHES 1011
organizations that are essential for the performance of governmental
functions can be classified as tax immune under this doctrine. 10 9 Al-
though an Edge corporation performs a service that is beneficial to the
nation's economy," 0 it is a privately-owned corporation operated for
Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530, 548 (1888); Railroad v. Peniston, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31-33 (1873); Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner,
259 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1977); Winchester v. Porterfield, 27 Ohio St. 2d 122,
129, 271 N.E.2d 786, 791 (1971); B. Schwartz, supra note 84, § 2.6, at 56; L. Tribe,
supra note 84, § 6-28, at 392 n.7; see, e.g., Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v.
Board of Equalization, 288 U.S. 325, 328 (1933); Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509,
514 (1931); William v. City of Talladega, 226 U.S. 404, 416 (1912). The rationale
was best explained in Railroad v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5 (1873). A railroad
that had been chartered by Congress to create national roads was deemed not to be
immune from taxation under the federal instrumentality doctrine. Id. at 31-32, 34-
35. The Supreme Court reasoned that the federal government would have "no more
ownership of the road authorized by Congress than they had in [a] road authorized
by Kansas." Id. at 34. One court, in dictum, has suggested that constitutional due
process limitations may prevent a state from taxing an Edge corporation because of
its federal charter. Commonwealth v. First Pa. Overseas Fin. Corp., 425 Pa. 143,
146-47, 229 A.2d 896, 898 (1967). The due process clause restricts the ability of a
state to tax an interstate corporation in two ways: 1) a tax may not be imposed unless
there is some relation between the corporate activity and the taxing state, Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); and 2) the income attributed to the
taxing state must be rationally related to "values connected with the taxing State."
Id. at 273 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325 (1968)). It does not appear, however, that the mere existence of a federal charter
is sufficient to limit state taxation on due process grounds.
Federal supervision of an entity also has been considered inadequate for granting
state tax immunity. See Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178, 181 (1933)
("The fact that a privilege has been received from the Federal Government does not
exempt that property or the local business in producing and selling it from the
burdens of taxation otherwise valid."); Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 259 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1977) ("The mere fact that an entity received its
charter from the Federal government and is regulated by the Federal government is
accordingly not sufficient to bring it within the statutory exemption."). In fact,
federal supervision of the Edge corporation is limited in order to provide the corpora-
tion with the flexibility needed to compete with foreign banks. See Federal Reserve
Report, supra note 23, at 1404. In 1979, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System stated that there would be some disadvantages in allowing Edge
corporations to become members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. at 1407. The
Edge corporation would be subject to some greater restrictions as a member bank.
Id.
109. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-60 (1966);
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 483, 485 (1942); see James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1937) (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926)).
110. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. While Congress has consid-
ered Edge corporations important in assisting the United States' import and export
markets, see supra note 16 and accompanying text, mere performance of a service for
the federal government is not sufficient to confer tax immunity. See United States v.
Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964) (contractor that did work for the federal government
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private profit."' A federally chartered private corporation that only
incidentally benefits the national economy" 2 generally is not consid-
ered to perform a substantial governmental function.11 3
In addition, Edge corporations can be distinguished from those few
private entities that the Supreme Court has deemed immune from
taxation as federal instrumentalities. For example, the Court has held
that the Red Cross, a private organization, is tax immune as a federal
instrumentality." 4 The Court emphasized that the Red Cross per-
forms substantial governmental functions and is subject to substantial
federal supervision:" 5 It is subject to periodic federal audit;" its
chairman and certain members of its executive board are federally
appointed; "17 it is authorized to meet national obligations arising out
held not to be tax immune); Railroad v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5 (1873)
(company that built railroad under a federal charter held not to be tax immune).
111. See 12 U.S.C. § 619 (Supp. V 1981) (statutory provision providing for owner-
ship of shares by citizens). Edge corporations are owned and operated by other
banks, Kelly, supra note 2, at 37; see S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1421, 1425, such as national banks,
see Bank of Am. v. United States, 680 F.2d 142, 143 (Ct. Cl. 1982). National banks
are privately owned. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S.
339, 357 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscag-
lia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 367, 235 N.E.2d 101, 106, 288 N.Y.S.2d 33, 40-41 (1967), rev'd
on other grounds upon rehearing, 23 N.Y.2d 933, 246 N.E.2d 361, 298 N.Y.S.2d 513,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941 (1969). Thus, the Edge corporation may be compared to
the private contractor performing services for the government for private profit-an
entity that the Supreme Court continually has held subject to state taxation. United
States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964) (The Constitution "does not forbid a tax whose
legal incidence is upon a contractor doing business with the United States, even
though the economic burden of the tax . . . is ultimately borne by the United
States."); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958) ("[I]t is well
settled that the Government's constitutional immunity does not shield private parties
with whom it does business from state taxes imposed on them merely because part or
all of the financial burden of the tax eventually falls on the Government."); see
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Curry v. United States, 314 U.S.
14, 17-18 (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 154-55 (1937). But
see Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954) (federal contractor held
immune from state gross receipts tax).
112. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964); United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 469 (1958); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
154-55 (1937).
113. See B. Schwartz, supra note 84, § 2.6, at 56; L. Tribe, supra note 84, § 6-28,
at 392 n.7; see, e.g., Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178, 180-81 (1933);
Railroad v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31-32 (1873); National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (D. Kan.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 948
(1973).
114. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358-60 (1966).
115. Id. at 359.
116. Id.; see 36 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
117. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 (1966); see
36 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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of certain foreign treaties;" 8 and it receives significant federal assis-
tance.'1
Congress has historically viewed the Red Cross as a quasi-govern-
mental institution. 120 By contrast, the federal government's role in
supervising the activities of Edge corporations is administrative and
more limited in nature.'2 1 While the federal government regulates the
banking activities of the Edge corporation, it is not authorized to
control the appointment of directors or to involve itself in the corpora-
tion's policy-making.122 Moreover, no comparable legislative tradition
of holding the Edge corporation tax immune exists. 123
Nevertheless, courts have held various private financial institutions
to be federal instrumentalities even though they exhibit few federal
characteristics.' 24 For example, the Supreme Court has held that Fed-
118. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 (1966); see
Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the
Sick of Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074 (1932); Geneva Convention
For the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat.
940 (1882).
119. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 n.11 (1966);
see 36 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) (federal government furnishes the Red Cross with a
national headquarters in Washington, D.C.).
120. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1966);
H.R. Rep. No. 1728, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952); see also Proclamation of President
Taft, Aug. 22, 1911, 37 Stat. 1716 (executive branch proclaiming that only the Red
Cross would be authorized to aid the United States armed forces in time of war).
121. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, .6-.7
(1982). Besides the general banking restrictions governing Edge corporations, federal
supervision rests primarily with the Board of Governors, which prescribes and re-
views the annual financial reports of the corporation. Id. § 211.7 (1982). See supra
note 101 and accompanying text.
122. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 12 C.F.R. § 211.4-.7
(1982).
123. The legislative history, in fact, suggests that the Edge corporation was to be
more independent than other federally chartered financial institutions. See 58 Cong.
Rec. 8083 (1919) (statement of Rep. Phelan) (Edge corporations are more indepen-
dent than national banks); Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23, at 1407 (recom-
mending that the Edge corporation be denied Federal Reserve membership).
124. The list includes: 1) Federal Reserve Banks, Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d
1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982); Federal Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist.
#1, 657 F.2d 183, 186 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 995 (1982), 2) Federal National
Mortgage Associations, Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 964 (1979); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364,
1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); but see Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 359
(5th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 31-32 (6th
Cir. 1975), 3) Federal Credit Unions, United States v. Maine, 524 F. Supp. 1056,
1059 (D. Me. 1981), 4) Federal Home Loan Banks, Association of Data Processing
Serv. Org. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1977);
Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 952 (1953), 5) Federal Savings & Loan Associations, United States v. State Tax
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 963, 969 (1st Cir. 1973); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
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eral Land Banks125 and national banks12 6 are federal instrumentalities
immune from unauthorized state taxation. Certain factors, however,
compelled those conclusions. In holding that the Federal Land Bank is
immune from state taxation, the Court had a clear legislative directive
upon which to base its decision.' 27 Section 26 of the Federal Farm
Loan Act of 1916 12 states that the Federal Land Bank is to be consid-
ered a federal instrumentality and expressly prohibits state taxation. 29
Section 627 of the Edge Act contains no comparable language.
Rather, the language in section 627 affirmatively grants state taxation
authority. 30
Similarly, despite the private characteristics of national banks, the
Supreme Court traditionally has held them to be federal instrumental-
Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 1945); but see Gibson v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Midwest Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 259 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1977); Winchester v.
Porterfield, 27 Ohio St. 2d 122, 129, 271 N.E.2d 786, 791 (1971), 6) Federal Land
Banks, Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146, 149 (1961);
Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1941), and 7)
national banks, First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339,
340 (1968); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244 (1931); Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1899); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159,
213, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819).
125. E.g., Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 368 U.S. 146, 149
(1961); Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1941). A
Federal Land Bank is a federally chartered entity established for the purpose of
"assuring farmers opportunity to borrow money upon long-term mortgages, at mini-
mum interest rates." 7B Michie on Banks and Banking § 267, at 137 (W. Willson, J.
Vaughan, R. Thiele & J. Dandridge eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Michie].
126. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 340 (1968);
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244 (1931); First Nat'l Bank v.
City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 550 (1927); Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather,
263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 667-
68 (1899); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 213, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819). A
national bank is a federally chartered entity initially established "for the purpose of
providing a currency for the whole country and a market for the loans of the general
government." 7 Michie, supra note 125, § 1, at 4.
127. Federal Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'r, 368 U.S. 146, 155-56(1961); Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1941); see
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245, § 26, 39 Stat. 360, 380, repealed by Pub. L.
No. 92-181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624 (1971).
128. Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245, § 26, 39 Stat. 360, 380, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 92-181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624 (1971). The repeal of the statute has
only moved the taxation provision to another section, 12 U.S.C. § 2055 (1976).
129. Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245, § 26, 39 Stat. 360, 380, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 92-181, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624 (1971).
130. 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
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ities' 3' on the basis of the clear intent in the legislative history132 of the
NBA.' 3 3 In the Court's most recent analysis of national banks,'3 4 it
refused to reach the instrumentality issue in light of this clear congres-
sional intent to limit state taxation of these banks.' 35 In 1969, how-
ever, Congress amended the NBA to authorize nondiscriminatory
state taxation of national banks.1 36 Congress determined that there
was "no longer any justification for.., continuing to grant national
banks immunities from State taxation which are not afforded State
banks.' 3 7 Therefore, the prior congressional intent to exempt a na-
tional bank from state taxation is no longer present. 138
Both courts and the legislature have noted similarities between the
statutes governing Edge corporations and those governing national
banks. '"9 For example, their respective taxation statutes were passed
to prevent discriminatory state taxation favoring state-chartered insti-
tutions.' 40 The substantial erosion of state tax immunity for national
131. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 340 (1968);
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244 (1931); First Nat'l Bank v.
City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 550 (1927); Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather,
263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 667-
68 (1899); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 213, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819).
132. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1893-95 (1864).
133. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 99, 111 (currently codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
134. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
135. Id. at 341; see Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1893-95 (1864).
136. Pub. L. No. 91-156, §§ 1(a), 2(a), 83 Stat. 434, 434 (1969) (currently codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
137. S. Rep. No. 530, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1594, 1595. As a result, despite the national bank's status as a federal
instrumentality, a state now has express plenary authority to tax the national bank
provided that it is done in a nondiscriminatory manner. See 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976).
138. See S. Rep. No. 530, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1594, 1595 ("The committee is in full accord with the [principle]
that every State government should be allowed the greatest possible degree of auton-
omy with regard to the formulation of its tax structure [with respect to national
banks.]").
139. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Tax Comm'n, 437 U.S. 255, 258 (1978)
(12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976) and 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976) were passed to "protect federally
chartered financial institutions from 'unequal and unfriendly competition' caused by
state tax laws favoring state-chartered institutions." (footnote omitted)); Apfel v.
Mellon, 33 F.2d 805, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ("The statutes relating to the organization
of national banks are analogous to [the statutes relating to the organization of Edge
corporations.]"), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 585 (1929); 58 Cong. Rec. 8083 (1919)
(statement of Rep. Phelan) ("These corporations are just as independent of the
Government as the national banks are to-day.").
140. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Tax Comm'n, 437 U.S. 255, 258 & n.2
(1978). In addressing the state taxation of a Federal Credit Bank, the Supreme Court
recently stated that "there has been no departure from the principle that state taxes
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banks suggests that the similarities of a national bank to an Edge
corporation should not be relied upon to grant the Edge corporation
state tax immunity. 14 1 In light of this erosion, it is unlikely that
Congress would prohibit nondiscriminatory taxation of Edge corpo-
rate branches in states in which the home office is not located. 4 2
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
A. The Need for Legislative Action
The banking field traditionally is an area of congressional con-
cern. 43 Accordingly, it has been suggested that the issue of Edge
corporate branch taxation can only be resolved through congressional
action. 4 4 The ABA Committee has recommended repeal of section
627 as part of a broader plan to establish a uniform method of state
taxation of federal depositories. 45 Given the existing ambiguity be-
tween the taxation practice of certain states and the lack of a provision
expressly authorizing this practice, congressional action is indeed war-
ranted. Nevertheless, in the interim, congressional inaction should not
preclude the judiciary from resolving the issue by upholding the appli-
cation of state taxation statutes to Edge corporate branches in non-
home office states. 46
are constitutionally invalid if they discriminate against the Government." Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 103 S. Ct. 692, 696 n.7 (1983).
141. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
142. Cf. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 103 S. Ct. 692, 696 n.7 (1983)
("[T]he scope of the Federal Government's Constitutional tax immunity has been
interpreted more narrowly in recent years.").
143. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 345 (1968).
144. See O'Brien, supra note 10, at 897; New Rules, supra note 10, at 219.
145. Committee on Banking and Say. Insts., Tax Section Recommendation No.
1981-3, 34 Tax Law. 861, 862 (1981). Currently, there is no uniform jurisdictional
standard for taxation of federal depositories, id., nor is there a uniform standard for
apportioning the tax base among the states in which the bank is located, id. The ABA
recommendation presents a uniform standard for interstate taxation of federal depos-
itories. Id. at 861. While this Note supports the ABA's recommendation to repeal §
627, the broader issue is beyond the scope of this Note. While the ABA proposal
expressly includes Edge corporations, two bills have been introduced in Congress that
conceivably would have had an impact on § 627. The Interstate Taxation of Deposi-
tories Act of 1979 would have provided for a uniform system of interstate taxation of
financial institutions. 125 Cong. Rec. 5739-41 (1979) (interpreting S. 719, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)). The Interstate Taxation Act of 1979 would have established
a uniform method of apportioning corporate income among the states. S. 983, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979), reprinted in Corporate Income Hearings, supra note 40, at
22; Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Description of S. 983
and S. 1688 Relating to State Taxation of Interstate Business and Foreign Source
Corporate Income 4 (joint Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as Staff Report].
146. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
STATE TAXATION OF EDGE BRANCHES
B. State Fiscal Concerns
The Edge corporation should not be able to escape paying its fair
share of taxes in a state in which it is doing business. 47 Generally, if a
corporation does business within a state, the state may tax the income
of the corporation attributable to business activities within the
state. 14 8 When an Edge corporation does business within a state, it
uses state services and is under the protection of state law. 149 It would
be inappropriate to shield the Edge corporate branch from paying for
such services and benefits merely because its home office is not located
in the state.
Moreover, if a court were to interpret section 627 as preventing
non-home office states from taxing branches, the anomalous result is
that states in effect would lose taxation power over Edge corporations
that they had prior to the amendment of Regulation K. Because each
Edge corporation initially had to be separately incorporated in the
state in which it conducted business, 150 the corporation was subject to
taxation by any state in which it was located. Under this interpreta-
tion, the amendment allowing the establishment of domestic branches
without requiring separate incorporation would deprive home states
of the taxation authority they previously possessed over Edge corpora-
tions located and doing business within the state.' 5 '
Since McCulloch, the determination whether an entity is tax im-
mune has implicitly rested on traditional theories of federalism.15 2 The
theory is that state taxation of an entity that has been deemed to be
closely connected to the federal government may create an interfer-
ence with substantive federal policy.153 Authorizing state taxation of
147. Zamora, supra note 9, at 464.
148. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452
(1959); Smith v. Lummis, 149 Fla. 660, 667, 6 So. 2d 625, 627-28 (1942); Interna-
tional Textbook Co. v. Connelly, 67 Misc. 49, 58, 124 N.Y.S. 603, 609, af'd per
curiam, 140 A.D. 939, 125 N.Y.S. 1125 (1910), aff'd, 206 N.Y. 188, 99 N.E. 722
(1912); see Corporate Income Hearings, supra note 40, at 689; Staff Report, supra
note 145, at 3. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
149. See 58 Cong. Rec. 4969 (1919) (statement of Sen. Norris).
150. Federal Reserve Report, supra note 23, at 1404.
151. Nothing in the legislative history to the IBA suggests that Congress wished to
limit the authority of a state to tax an Edge corporation. See S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1421, 1422-26.
152. See Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943); James v. Dravo Con-
tracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 154-55 (1937) (quoting Railroad v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 5, 36-37 (1873)); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 212-13, 4 Wheat. 316, 435-36 (1819); United
States v. City of Leavenworth, 443 F. Supp. 274, 278 (D. Kan. 1977); L. Tribe,
supra note 84, § 6-31, at 401.
153. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937); Metcalf & Eddy
v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); United States v. City of Leavenworth, 443 F.
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the Edge corporate branch in a state in which the home office is not
located does not create such an interference with federal policy be-
cause the Edge corporation is not closely connected with the federal
government. 5 4 To suggest that state taxation of these branches would
interfere with federal policy in light of permissible home-state taxa-
tion would be inconsistent. 55 The expansion of tax immunity to en-
compass the Edge corporate branch would interfere instead with state
sovereignty, 5 6 and would represent a "manipulation" of federal tax
laws that has "no proper place in determining the allocation of power
between co-existing sovereignties.'1 5
7
CONCLUSION
The federal government should restrict state authority to tax a
corporate organization doing business within state boundaries only
under the clearest and narrowest of circumstances. The supremacy
clause of the Constitution should not be construed so as to alter
traditional notions of federalism. An Edge corporation should not be
deemed a federal instrumentality, and thus its branches should be
subject to state taxation. Because Congress has not explicitly intended
to preclude state taxation of branches, and in light of existing policy
considerations, a state should have the authority to tax the Edge
corporate branch doing business in that state. The rapid escalation of
Edge corporate development requires that the issue be resolved and
that the current state policy of taxing Edge corporate branches in non-
home office states be endorsed.
Leo Vincent Gagion
Supp. 274, 278 (D. Kan. 1977); L. Tribe, supra note 84, § 6.28, at 392; see United
States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982); Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S.
441, 445 (1943); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 159, 213, 4 Wheat. 316, 435-36
(1819).
154. See supra notes 108-42 and accompanying text.
155. See 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
156. Such a policy would expand immunity to institutions primarily on the basis
of a federal charter or federal regulation. State fiscal interests would be invaded, and
tax immunity would be extended beyond all reasonable boundaries. See supra pt.
III(A).
157. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 737 (1982).
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